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In the Social Contract Jean-Jacques Rousseau identifies Corsica as the last place in Europe capable of 
receiving his political proposals. To understand why this may be, this paper examines the historical 
and intellectual relationship between Rousseau's thought, enlightened European society, and 
Corsica in the eighteenth century. In doing this it identifies what was unique about the island, noting 
the perceived ‘savagery’ of its people, and thus, their capability to be given Rousseau’s laws. It then 
examines how proposals from Rousseau’s Constitutional Project for Corsica relate to the Social 
Contract, noting that the historical particularities of Corsica allow for further understanding of the 
proposals in the latter text. 
Keywords: Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Corsica; social contract; enlightenment; eighteenth century; 
constitutions; Pasquale Paoli; legislator; lawgiver; political founding; human nature; commerce; 
religion; democracy 
Enlightened ‘Savages’: Rousseau's Social Contract and the ‘Brave 
People’ of Corsica1 
In 1762 Jean-Jacques Rousseau told readers of the Social Contract that the contents of his 
treatise on the principles of political right were entirely inapplicable to his European 
audience – with one exception: 
There is one country left in Europe capable of receiving legislation; it is the island of Corsica. 
The valour and steadfastness with which this brave people was able to recover and defend 
its freedom would amply deserve that some wise man teach it to preserve it. I rather suspect 
that this small island will one day astound Europe.2 
This footnote is a signpost: if Corsica was the last place capable of applying the lessons 
offered by the Social Contract one should ask why. This is a question that has received 
remarkably little attention from Rousseau scholars, and which this paper seeks to answer.3  
                                                          
1
 The author would like to thank Laurence Brockliss, Christopher Brooke, and Jon Parkin who provided 
feedback on an earlier version of this paper. The current version has benefitted from comments by the 
anonymous reviewers at History of Political Thought, Robin Douglass, Mathieu Luzurier, Volker Heins, and the 
attendees at the Institute for Historical Research’s History of Political Ideas early career seminar.  
2
 Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.OC, p. 391 (Gourevitch, p. 78). All references to Rousseau are to the Pléiade 
editions first, followed by the source of the English translation when used (unless translations are the author’s 
own). Letters come from R. A. Leigh's Correspondance complète de Rousseau (Oxford, 1965-1998). English 
editions used are: Victor Gourevitch's Rousseau: 'The Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings (Cambridge, 
1997) and Rousseau: 'The Social Contract' and Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge, 1997); and Roger D. 
Masters and Christopher Kelly’s editions for Dartmouth College Press' Collected Writings of Rousseau 
(Hanover, 1990-2010). 
3
 Corsica is a topic in Rousseau scholarship which has received little attention. In 1959 F.G. Healey claimed that 
the project had only one modern work dedicated to it: E. Dedeck-Héry’s 1932 dissertation J.-J. Rousseau et le 
Projet de constitution pour la Corse (‘Rousseau, Voltaire and Corsica: Some notes on an interesting enigma’, 
Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century, 10 (1959) pp. 413-419, p. 414). In 1989 this work was still being 
referred to as ‘one of the few extended studies’ on the topic (T.E. Hall, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the Corsican 
To address this issue, however, a historical description of Corsica is insufficient. Corsica, as 
Rousseau understood it, may or may not have been historically accurate.4 Thus it is 
necessary to recreate the Corsica Rousseau – and others – had access to by turning to 
eighteenth-century reports. In this way one can attempt to engage with the island using 
Rousseau’s own methodology: 
Just as an architect, before putting up a large building, observes and tests the ground to see 
whether it can support the weight, so the wise institutor does not begin by drawing up laws 
good in themselves, but first examines whether the people for whom he intends them is fit 
to bear them.5 
This leads to the paper’s second aim: by noting why Corsica was an ideal situ for Rousseau’s 
political building we can then turn to the Constitutional Project for Corsica and, by 
comparing specific proposals with those in the Social Contract, come to understand what 
Rousseau saw as the practical implications of his own political ideas. That is, in addition to 
recognizing what was special about Corsica, by turning to the actual proposals he made for 
the island and recognizing how his ideas are modified (or not) when applied, one can gain 
more understanding of the practicalities of his political thought.6  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
connection’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century, 267 (1989) pp. 199-215). Both Vaughan and 
Masters noted it as being important, but requiring further study (C.E. Vaughan, ‘Rousseau as Political 
Philosopher’, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1915), p. vii; 80; R.D. 
Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1976), p. 411), while Hendel and J.C. Hall dismissed 
its relevance altogether (C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), pp. xiv–xv; J.C. 
Hall, Rousseau: An Introduction to his Political Philosophy (London, 1973), p. 8). This failure to engage with the 
text remains evident: The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau (Cambridge, 2001) contains two references to 
the island in the index, and Leo Damrosch's recent biography Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius (Boston 
and New York, 2005) – stretching over 500 pages – makes three. When the island is addressed it has often 
been treated in tandem with Poland – the other nation which asked Rousseau to aid in its legislation (See: M. 
Canovan, ‘The Limits of Seriousness: Rousseau and the Interpretation of Political Theory’, European History 
Quarterly, 2 (1972), pp. i-24; N. Dent, ‘Poland and Corsica’, Rousseau (London and New York, 2005); R. P. 
Hanley, ‘Enlightened Nation Building: The “Science of the Legislator” in Adam Smith and Rousseau’, American 
Journal of Political Science, 52 (2008) pp. 219–234; E. Putterman, ‘Realism and Reform in Rousseau's 
Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica’, Political Studies, 49 (2001) pp. 481–494). The problem with this 
approach, however, is that it fails to address the particulars of each nation while attempting to develop a 
single systematic description of Rousseau's political works. Many of the works which have engaged with 
Corsica specifically have detached Rousseau’s work from history (M.D. Mendham, ‘Gentle Savages and Fierce 
Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's Paradoxes’, American Journal of Political Science, 55 (2011) 
pp. 170-187; D. Schaeffer, ‘Attending to Time and Place in Rousseau's Legislative Art’, The Review of Politics, 74 
(2012) pp. 421-441). Historical specificity, however, is important for Rousseau. The most useful works in this 
vein remain Thadd E. Hall’s two historical studies for SVEC: the previously mentioned ‘Corsican connection’ 
and ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and the 
eighteenth century, 64 (1968) pp.165-85 and, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century, 267 (1989) pp. 
199-215). 
4
 D. Carrington, Granite Island: A Portrait of Corsica (London, 1974), pp. 265-266. 
5
 Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.OC, pp. 384-385 (Gourevitch, p. 72). 
6
 This allows one to recognize that the Social Contract, which is often treated as a piece of theoretical work 
detached from particulars, contains ideas which need to be tied to particular places and times. Although an 
entirely theoretical reading of the Social Contract is not universal. See H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva: 
From the First Discourse to The Social Contract, 1749-1762 (Cambridge, 2007) and R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau 
To address both issues this paper begins by reconstructing a historical image of Corsica. 
Reports of the island and its people are used to develop a description which would have 
been available to Rousseau. Following this, the paper investigates the island’s relationship 
with the thoughts and ideas of the philosophes, drawing attention to their interest in the 
island’s enlightened lawgiver Pasquale Paoli. This allows one to highlight what was unique 
about Rousseau’s position by comparing reports on the people of Corsica with descriptions 
of peoples in his own theoretical works. Finally, a reading of Corsica and the Social Contract 
is made (specifically in relation to commerce, democracy and class, and religion). Similarities 
and distinctions, which emerge when the particular context Rousseau was addressing is 
foregrounded, allow one to see how Rousseau’s theoretical ideas were applied in a practical 
manner. 
Corsica in European Consciousness 
Descriptions of Corsica from ancient history are far from charming. Strabo’s Geography, 
completed circa 23 CE, described the island as affording ‘such a poor livelihood – being not 
only rough but in most of its parts absolutely impracticable for travel – that those who 
occupy the mountains and live from brigandage are more savage than wild animals.’7 
Seneca, who spent eight years exiled on the island between 41-49 CE, wrote to his mother: 
‘Can you find a hunk of rock that is as barren and craggy everywhere as Corsica is? Or more 
deprived of basic resources and with less civilized people? Is there any landscape more wild 
or sky more gray and gloomy?’8 The island may have been better off were it ignored for 
these faults. Instead, however, Corsica’s history is largely one of war and servitude. From at 
least 566 BCE Corsica had been occupied by, or faced recurring raids from, the Ionians, 
Etruscans, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Ostrogoths, Lombards, the Papacy, 
Saracens, Franks, Pisans, Moors, and the Genoese – the last of who turned the island into an 
agricultural base in 1299 and made it a political dependency in 1347. For the following 400 
years Corsica was plundered and the Corsican people abused. Many who could fled, while 
others became victims of the vendetta which flourished during Genoese rule. The rest 
worked in agriculture, the products of which went to Genoa. Other forms of commercial 
activity were either put down or monopolized by the Genoese. 
To make ruling easier the nobility was dismantled and the Corsicans were locked out of any 
governance beyond local administration (and even this was due to Genoese disinterest, 
rather than concession). The upshot of this combination, however, meant the Genoese 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern Intellectual History, 3 
(2006), pp. 385–413. 
7
 Strabo: Geography, trans. H.L. Jones (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1923), Book V, Chapter 2 (p. 359). 
8
 Seneca, ‘Consolation to His Mother Helvia’, in Selected Dialogues and Consolations (Indianapolis, 2015), 6.5 
(p. 187). 
encouraged the ‘democratic, collective system in the villages that served as a basis for the 
eighteenth-century constitutional experiments.’9 Carrington writes:  
The rural Corsicans were left free to run their own affairs; the Genoese never swarmed over 
the interior; they remained in their six fortified towns on the coasts… When they interfered 
with rural life it was to encourage agriculture, and this campaign was sufficiently successful 
to create a new class of well-off, well-educated rural notables. These were however the very 
people who most resented Genoese colonial trade monopolies and became the most 
dangerous enemies of the Republic.10  
Hall also picks up on this: 
Genoa did not make the administrative and political reforms that would have enabled it to 
govern Corsica efficiently, nor did it make the military and financial reforms necessary to 
suppress rebellion. Consequently, its possession of the island was constantly threatened… 
Uninspired, inefficient, and oppressive, Genoese officials thought of Corsica only as a colony 
and did not attempt to make the island part of the republic.11 
Thus, when Corsica revolted in 1729, the uprising was far from anarchic.12 Their experiences 
in self-governance had prepared them for larger democratic experiments. A national diet 
was called, demands were drafted, and issued to the Genoese governor in 1730 (which were 
promptly rejected). Protracted discussions continued, frustrating the rebels, for another 
year. Nonetheless, the Corsicans were able to maintain cohesion and in January 1731, 
Corsica declared independence, established self-rule, and adopted a constitution.13 
This first revolt was supressed in 1733 with the aid of Charles VI’s troops. Having been left 
with the costs for having put down the revolt, while suffering embarrassment on the 
international stage, encouraged Genoa’s new governor to be even harsher towards the 
locals; justice became summary, and lists were drafted of suspects to be jailed. 
Unsurprisingly a second rebellion broke out in 1734, and a second declaration of 
independence was made in 1735. While the Corsicans initially lacked the material supplies 
and international support for their revolt to succeed, their luck seemed to change with the 
arrival of Baron Theodore von Neuhoff.  
                                                          
9
 Carrington, Granite Island, p. 11. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
11
 T.E. Hall, France and the Eighteenth-Century Corsican Question (New York, 1971), p. 6. 
12
 The revolt is generally attributed to Genoa raising agricultural taxes under the guise of payment for corn 
shipped to the island after two failed harvests. However, this followed an incident of Genoese mistreatment of 
a Corsican regiment stationed in Finale Ligure (ironically there to quell any potential revolt). Thrasher notes 
that ‘The Corsicans who served in the Genoese regiments were one of the few sources of national pride 
Corsicans could claim’ (Thrasher, Pasquale Paoli: An Enlightened Hero 1725-1807 (London, 1970), p. 32). Thus, 
the mistreatment, and ultimate execution, of a number of these troops raised tensions in Corsica before the 
tax revolt (Hall, France and the Eighteenth-Century, pp. 10-11). 
13
 Three Primates were elected (including Pasquale Paoli’s father Giacinto) from the elected generals of the 
rebellion. They led a six-member junta and diet made up of a delegate from every village (Hall, France and the 
Eighteenth-Century Corsican Question, p. 11). 
On 12 March 1736 a ‘bizarre figure’ arrived in Corsica, ‘wearing a scarlet silk caftan, 
Moresque breeches, yellow half-boots, and a Spanish hat topped by a peacock feather.’ 
Claiming his arrival was a response to ‘oft-repeated letters’ and the ‘steadfast love and 
fidelity shown by [the Corsicans] for over two years.’14 James Boswell reported that: ‘He 
brought with him about a thousand [gold coins], besides some arms and ammunitions, and 
made magnificent promises of foreign assistance; so that the Corsicans, who were glad of 
any support, willingly gave into his schemes.’15 That is, in exchange for aid he was able to 
have himself declared King of Corsica. The Corsicans did not embrace an absolute monarch, 
however. They required their new king submit himself to a diet of twenty-four members and 
a ban on making decisions related to war or taxation – as Carrington noted: ‘True to their 
political inventiveness, the Corsicans had given themselves a constitutional monarchy.’16  
Neuhoff’s reign was short, however. After eight months, and having noticed how the 
‘people began to cool their affections towards him, and did not act with the same resolution 
as before [he] wisely determined to leave them for a little, and try his fortune again upon 
the continent.’17 While in Holland he was able to secure some loans, the funds of which he 
sent to Corsica, but he never returned to the island himself – he had a price placed on his 
head by Genoa which led him to ‘relinquish his throne, and give up his views of ambition for 
safety.’18 He ended up in London where he spent some time in a debtors’ prison, became an 
acquaintance of Horace Walpole (who helped secure his release and wrote his epitaph), and 
passed away in 1756.19 While it is reported that the short-reigning monarch had no long 
term impact on the island itself, his arrival re-invigorated the Corsican independence 
movement, while aiding Corsica’s emergence as a topic du jour on the continent.20 
Before the 1729 revolt Corsica was essentially a mystery to the continent, ‘nearly as 
unknown to Europe as California or Japan.’21 And while with the first revolt the Mercure de 
France began reporting on Corsica, it was with the reinvigorated rebellion and the 
momentary emergence of their monarch that Corsica became ‘a la mode... [A]lmost month 
                                                          
14
 J.T. Bent, ‘The King of Corsica’, The English Historical Review (London, April 1896), p. 296. 
15
 J. Boswell, An Account of Corsica: The Journal of a Tour to That Island; and Memoirs of Pascal Paoli (London, 
1768), p. 102. Interestingly, Boswell’s five weeks in Corsica were aided by a letter of introduction from 
Rousseau, and although the text is largely a travel report, Carrington notes that Boswell was ‘remarkably well 
informed’ in those areas which he was not a first-hand witness (Granite Island, p. 266). 
16
 Carrington, Granite Island, p. 254. 
17
 Boswell, An Account of Corsica, p. 104. 
18
 Ibid., p. 105. 
19
 Walpole’s epitaph can be found on Neuhoff’s gravestone at St Anne’s Church, Soho, London, not far from a 
pub which, until recently, memorialized the short-lived monarch by taking the name ‘The King of Corsica.’ 
20
 Hall, ‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, p. 167. Aylmer Vallance’s biography offers this verdict on his 
rule: ‘The man who became a legitimate monarch, and wore a crown through one hot Corsican summer, had 
something in him, no doubt, of the eighteenth-century gambler’s fever […] but, though he had certainly little 
to lose, he was not a madman but a clever rogue who succeeded, by sheer effrontery, in focusing, for a short 
spell, the limelight of European power-politics on his doings’ (A. Vallance, The Summer King (London, 1956), p. 
7). 
21
 Carrington, ‘The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)’, English Historical Review, 88 (1973) 
pp. 481-503, p. 485. 
by month the continent was kept up to date.’22 There was plenty to report, as well: Genoa 
struggled to regain control over the island and France, who sent troops at Genoa’s request 
in 1738, suffered their own embarrassing defeat. Control was restored in 1739, but interest 
continued to be piqued by Genoa’s apparent weakness; Corsica, to some, appeared ripe for 
the taking, and interested parties included France, Spain, the Two Sicilies, England, Austria, 
and Sardinia-Piedmont.23 
Public interest was not entirely motivated by political intrigue, though. Hall has argued that 
‘curiosity about Corsican affairs was natural for eighteenth-century educated Europeans. 
They were intrigued by unknowns, and Corsica was unknown.’24 He describes an obsession 
with ‘unusual people,’ such as the Turks, Siamese, Persians, Chinese, Africans, and American 
Indians, and notes that the Corsicans, with their uncivilized customs (especially the 
vendetta) easily fit into this category. Details reported crossed the spectrum from the 
mundane (the size of the island) to the extraordinary (Corsicans ‘need only stones to fight’), 
highlighting Europe's ignorance of the island, but also a keen desire to correct this.25 As 
interest grew new sources proliferated. 
As reports from returning soldiers began to be circulated recurring themes emerged – most 
common being the primitive state of the island. It was claimed that ‘nothing exists there, so 
to speak, and everything remains to be established’ and that the island was ‘in the cradle, 
and its infancy [would] surely be very long.’26 In Jacques Nicolas Bellin’s 1769 Description 
géographique et historique de l'isle de Corse it is reported: ‘There are neither titles, nor 
archives, nor monuments in that country, which mark the turn from antiquity.’27 It was not 
just the state of the island’s infrastructure that was seen as underdeveloped, however, the 
people themselves were reported as: ‘treacherous and terrible’; ‘gens de mauvais fois’; 
‘gens sans foir’; ‘extremely vindictive’; ‘fierce, treacherous, and jealous’; devout believers of 
everything they were told by monks; capable of fighting wars with simply pitchforks and 
sticks; ‘barbarous and illiterate’28 – Frederick Neuhoff – claimed son of Theodore – wrote 
that ‘their knowledge consisted in knowing how to scour the country, to pillage, to take 
                                                          
22
 Raymond Dumay, ‘Quand Figaro 1er regnait sur la Corse’, Les Oeuvre libres, 168 (1960), p. 85 (quoted in Hall, 
‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, p. 167). 
23
 Carrington, Granite Island, p. 256. The involvement of France is discussed extensively in Hall’s France and the 
Eighteenth Century Corsican Question. It has been argued by some (in particular, Édouard Driault and Louis 
Villat) that France had a long standing plan to annex the island, which Hall dismisses. However, he does make 
it clear that the island was of interest to many states during the eighteenth century. 
24
 Hall, ‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, p. 167. 
25
 Ibid., pp. 168-170; Carrington, ‘Corsican Constitution’, p. 485. 
26
 Quoted in T.E. Hall, ‘Thought and Practice of Enlightened Government in French Corsica’, The American 
Historical Review, 74 (1969) pp. 880-905, p. 885; Hall, ‘The Corsican connection’, p. 208. 
27
 J-N. Bellin, Description Géographique et Historique de L’isle de Corse Pour Joindre Aux Cartes et Plans de 
Cette Isle (1769), p. 69. 
28
 Hall, ‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, p. 170; Mably, ‘De la législation, ou Principes des loix’, 
Collection complete des oeuvres de L’Abbe de Mably, vol. 9 (Paris, 1794/1795), Book 2, Chapter 2, p. 172; 
Domenico Caminer, quoted in Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment: studies in a cosmopolitan century (New 
York, 1972), p. 145. 
good aim, and to form public ambuscades. They were not less ignorant in whatever 
regarded civil society.’29 Again, Bellin offers this description: 
The Corsican in general is deceitful, always trying to outwit and manipulate; it is this which 
makes it challenging: and if you want to obtain something from him, do not push too 
eagerly; stubborn as he is, he abandons nothing once a plan has been formed: difficulties, 
far from discouraging, serve to make him only more constant in his pursuit... He is full of 
superstitions, but charitable and hospitable for Monks and foreigners; living beyond his 
means; he will kill his relatives in cold-blood if they dare to contradict him: too proud to be 
given a penny, he will not hesitate stealing a pound… He is duplicitous with those who have 
what he needs; insolent and proud with those who need and cannot manage without him; 
greedy, not reliable, and lazy. His favourite hobby is vengeance, no cost is too high to 
succeed; it makes him labourious, patient, and liberal.30 
Their laziness was another repeated trope: ‘Their spirit is naturally weak and inconsistent. 
Laziness is their dominant vice: they are so lazy that they have time for farming, but not for 
the sciences, the liberal arts, engineering, nor trade.’31  
Frederick Neuhoff, again, writes: 
The Corsicans are well-made, but meagre and swarthy: they have a good mein, particularly 
under arms, are sober, and have hardly any wants. They content themselves with the 
necessities of life, nor are the dangerous superfluities of luxury yet looked upon as 
necessities. They are brave, intrepid, dextrous, tractable, spirited, and lively; but, on the 
other hand, they are proud, presumptuous, inconstant, choleric, cruel, intolerant, forsworn, 
given to theft, more superstitious than devout, and so addicted to the visionary absurdities 
of sortilege and fortune-telling... They have little probity, and are so distrustful of each other 
that they travel always armed, and even go to mass with a musket under their arm. They 
delight in a wandering life, and are particularly fond of hunting: this exercise, inuring them 
to a coarse and hardy way of living, gives them robust and healthy constitutions, as well as 
savage, free, and independent disposition.32 
All of this taught them ‘a thousand contrivances and other things which bear a near relation 
to a state of war; for which the Corsicans entertain a favourite passion.’33  
These are exactly the characteristics which prevented Enlightenment thinkers (in contrast to 
the public) from becoming interested in the island – Hall argues that the Corsicans were too 
                                                          
29
 F. Neuhoff, Memoirs of Corsica: Containing the natural and political history of that important island (London, 
1768), p. 117. 
30
 Bellin, Description Géographique, pp. 47-48. 
31
 Ibid., p. 49. 
32
 Neuhoff, Memoirs, p. 16-18. 
33
 Ibid., p. 18. 
violent, too superstitious, too savage – simply not enlightened enough.34 That is, until 1755 
and the rise of Pasquale Paoli, founder the Democratic Republic of Corsica. 
Enlightened Corsica and Pasquale Paoli 
Although born in Corsica, Pasquale Paoli was brought to Naples by his father Giacinto Paoli 
when he was fourteen. His father, a Corsican nationalist, noble, and general, fled the island 
after Genoese rule was restored in 1739. While in Naples, Pasquale studied at the Royal 
Academy, reportedly under the political philosopher and physiocrat economist Antonio 
Genovesi.35 He was a reader of Thucydides, Polybius, Livy, and Tacitus, and it is claimed that, 
like Jean-Jacques, was particularly fond of both Plutarch (whom it is claimed he could, again, 
like Rousseau, recite from memory) and Addison and Steele’s Spectator.36 He was a 
cultivated young enlightened gentleman who took up many of the philosophes' causes.37 He 
initially served in the Corsican regiment of the Neapolitan army, but was invited to return to 
Corsica by the island's four feuding regents after revolt broke out in 1753. He returned in 
1754, and on 15 July, 1755, having united the island, successfully pushed the Genoese out of 
many of their strongholds, and elected General of the Nation, he declared independence 
and gave the island a republican constitution.38  
In 1766 the London Chronicle highlighted Paoli’s enlightened successes, noting it was all the 
more incredible in light of Corsica’s past reputation for savagery: 
The Island of Corsica is now become an important object in Europe; General De Paoli having 
acted with so much wisdom and spirit, that the brave Corsicans are actually in possession of 
the whole Island, except for five fortified towns on the sea-coast, which are still under the 
dominion of the Genoese. The command which Corsica can have of the navigation in the 
Mediterranean must render those Islanders very considerable now that they have thrown 
off a foreign yoke, and are at last formed into a nation, having for so many years been so 
                                                          
34
 The Corsicans themselves were aware of this – when Boswell asked what he could do to return the favour 
Paoli had shown him on his visit, Paoli responded: ‘Only undeceive your court. Tell them what you have seen 
here. They will be curious to ask you. A man come from Corsica will be like a man come from the Antipodes’ 
(Boswell, An Account of Corsica, p. 322). See also: Hall, ‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, pp. 171-173. 
35
 Although it has often been reported that Pasquale studied under Genovesi at the Royal Academy, Venturi 
dismisses this as impossible – Genovesi only took his chair at the university after Pasquale had left (in 1754). 
However, it is possible he that he attended his lectures on ethics (Italy and the Enlightenment, p. 134). 
36
 Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment, p. 135; Hall, ‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, p. 173; L.H. 
Caird, The History of Corsica (London, 1899), p. 138. 
37
 Hall, ‘Development of Enlightenment interest’, p. 173. 
38
 The constitution formalized a General Diet whose members were largely elected by universal suffrage 
(initially) and were required to meet yearly, although Paoli and Corsica’s government became more pragmatic 
as time went on. Paoli worked hard to maintain the consent of those around him, although Carrington wrote 
that ‘while consistently proclaiming the sovereignty of the people Paoli often assumed the role of enlightened 
despot.’  Nonetheless, his position, as General of the Nation for life, could be revoked by Diet. For more details 
on the constitution of Paoli see: Carrington, ‘Corsican constitution’; Carrington, Granite Island, pp. 258-261; 
Caird, History of Corsica, pp. 133-142. On consent see Caird, History of Corsica, p. 142; Carrington, Granite 
Island, pp. 257-258. For a historical description see Robert Benson, Sketches of Corsica: Or, A Journal Written 
During a Visit to That Island, in 1823 (London, 1825), p. 99. 
divided into opposite parties, that they were looked upon by foreign powers as so many 
tribes of Savages.39 
In April 1767, Gentleman's Monthly published a manifesto by Corsica's Great Chancellor 
Giuseppe Maria Massesi, making it known to both the people of Genoa, and ‘all the world,’ 
that Corsica had emerged as a political equal on the European continent. Massesi offered a 
warning: 
From the long experience of thirty seven years, [Genoa] ought to be persuaded and 
convinced, that she has not force sufficient to subject us again to her dominion; and that we 
are more than ever firm and resolved, to maintain, whatever it may cost, the rights of our 
ancient liberty, which we have recovered with the effusion of so much blood. 
These were the events which led the philosophes to take interest.  
The island’s constitution gained the attention of enlightened Europe – resemblances were 
drawn between it and the constitutions of Rome, Sparta, and England.40 Thinkers across 
Europe recognized one of their own in power and Corsica became ‘the focal point for 
European pèlerins de la liberté’ and Paoli was the ‘hero of the enlightenment.’41 The 
famously cynical salonnière Marquise Du Deffand saw Paoli as the lawgiver who possessed 
goodness, truth, reason, and justice, comparing him to Horace Walpole and Voltaire 
complemented him in his Précis du siècle de Louis XV.42   
[O]n the domestic level journals like the Journal Encyclopedique carried Paoli's name to 
every quarter of the country, correspondents like Frédéric-Melchior Grimm made it familiar 
and famous around the courts of Sweden, Poland and Russia. In Italy Parini and Alfieri [...] 
were among the most illustrious of the generation of writers and poets who regarded Paoli 
as the Enlightened hero... Enlightened despots themselves swelled the chorus of praise; 
Joseph of Austria [...] frequently spoke of the General with admiration; so did Frederick the 
Great, whose admiration did not stop at words, but who sent Paoli a sword of honour with 
the words, 'Patria, libertas' inscribed on the blade.43 
Venturi noted: ‘[W]riters of the Enlightenment – more than is generally thought – were 
aware of the exemplary force of Paoli’s rebellion and testified to it in their works.’44 
Interest was ‘strongly influenced by an apparent similarity between lawgivers of ancient 
times and Pasquale Paoli’ – he was reported as a modern day Lycurgus or Numa, ‘leading his 
barbarous people into the full light of the civilized world.’45 This allowed Grimm to write 
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that ‘all honourable Europeans are interested in the fate of these brave people.’46 This point 
is important: these allusions do not simply refer to Paoli – the people themselves are seen 
as being akin to the Spartans before Lycurgus or Romans before Numa – wild and unruly. In 
(what has been attributed to) Domenico Caminer’s Historical essay on the Kingdom of 
Corsica from the rising of 129 up to the middle of 1768 we find this description: 
[Paoli] found an ardent and fierce people, all on fire in the cause of freedom but not 
sufficiently guided by established maxims. The Corsicans had been so long accustomed to 
bearing arms that they hardly knew the meaning of law and justice and were impatient of 
any restriction. They made Paoli undertake the great work of giving a new form to the 
government… Instead of forming a new legal code, he would do it gradually, according to 
the circumstances, the times and the temper of the people. He was always guided by the 
nature of the Corsicans and, like Solon, he could say that, if he had not made excellent laws, 
at least he had made the best that they were capable of receiving.47 
Boswell took a similar position. He described them as ‘impetuous, violent and brave,’ and 
wrote that Paoli, upon coming to power, ‘found the utmost disorder and confusion’ and 
that: 
There was no subordination, no discipline, no money, hardly any arms and ammunition; and, 
what was worse than all, little union among the people. He immediately began to remedy 
these defects. His persuasion and example, had wonderful force; all ranks exerted 
themselves, in providing what was necessary for carrying on the war with spirit.48  
Importantly, enlightened thinkers did not develop any fundamental interest or concern for 
Corsica’s fate until there were practical reasons for supposing that the Corsican character 
could be altered along the lines proposed by the philosophes themselves – that is, when 
enlightened conceptions being imposed emerged as a possibility.49  
However, the successes Paoli had secured remained at risk. His reign came to an end when 
Genoa, who had maintained that it had legal right to Corsica, sold ownership of the island to 
France.50 The threat was clear, and on returning to Britain, Boswell attempted to raise 
political and financial support for the Corsican cause, but with limited success.51 In 1768 
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Corsica was publically ceded to France, who once again sent troops to the island and the 
enlightened lawgiver fled to London in 1769.52  
Rousseau and the ‘Savage’ Corsicans 
While it was the overcoming of the savagery of the Corsican people that brought them into 
Enlightened Europe’s consciousness, it was the island’s savage qualities which excited 
Rousseau.53 In a fragment reflecting on the way they were portrayed in the press, Rousseau 
wrote that ‘the Gazetteers always call them rebels,’ but argued ‘the Corsicans, rebels or not, 
are free and worthy of being so in spite of the Genoese and the Gazetteers.’54 His concern 
was detached from any conceptions of them being rebellious, enlightened, or revolutionary 
– his interest was in them as a people. He made this point explicit in a 1770 letter: ‘We will 
see that I was first to recognize a people free and capable of discipline, where all of Europe 
saw nothing but a horde of bandits.’55  
Rousseau’s disinterest in Paoli’s political actions led Carrington to argue that Rousseau 
‘knew nothing of the Corsicans’ political system.’ Instead, it was ‘their struggle for national 
liberation [which] was sufficient to recommend them in his eyes.’56 This is only partially true, 
however. Beyond Paoli’s actions, and beyond the people’s desire for liberty, Rousseau was 
interested in reports of the Corsican’s savagery and innocence. To understand why this was 
important we need to remember the first problem facing a potential lawgiver: finding a 
people who can receive laws (in fact, it is at the end of this discussion in which the footnote 
on Corsica can be found). Rousseau clearly distinguishes between people who can be 
legislated for and those who cannot: ‘Peoples, like men,’ he writes, ‘are docile only in their 
youth, with age they grow incorrigible; once customs are established and prejudices rooted, 
it is a dangerous and futile undertaking to try to reform them.’57 The difficulty is finding a 
people ‘which combines the stability of an ancient people with the docility of a new 
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people.’58 Thus, those who already have moeurs and laws cannot be the legislator's raw 
materials. 
Customs and prejudices are inherently linked to a people's laws – the constitution of a state 
is the morality imbued in a people when founded:59 
[T]he most important of all [laws is that] which is graven not in marble or bronze, but in the 
hearts of the Citizens; which is the State's genuine constitution; which daily gathers new 
force; which, when other laws age or die out, revives or replaces them, and imperceptibly 
substitutes the force of habit for that of authority. I speak of morals, customs, and above all 
of opinion; a part [of the laws] unknown to our politicians but on which the success of all the 
others depends.60 
Therefore, it is not simply an issue of habit. Once individuals have been made into a people 
it becomes difficult – if not impossible – to remake them. When a people exit their natural 
state and enter civil society their original natural potential for such sociability is lost. As 
Rousseau made clear: ‘What makes the work of legislation difficult is not so much what has 
to be established as what has to be destroyed.’61 Thus: ‘Anyone who dares to institute a 
people must feel capable of, so to speak, changing human nature; of transforming each 
individual who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole.’62 Once 
this transformation is complete, the solitary individual cannot be returned to, and a new 
social individual cannot be created. This was the state of Corsica. They were part of an 
exclusive club, populated by the dispossessed criminals and refugees inhabiting Rome 
before Numa, the violent and lawless thugs of Sparta before Lycurgus, and the homeless 
masses that were the Jews before Moses.63 They were a rare people who were capable of 
receiving a constitution because they had yet to be given one. This is why he mentioned 
them in the Social Contract, and the following section will turn to the similarities between 
the Corsicans and Rousseau’s ideal people to demonstrate this. 
The Corsican People and Natural Man 
Immediately before mention of Corsica in the Social Contract Rousseau asked his readers: 
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What people, then, is fit for legislations? One which, while finding itself already bound 
together by some union of origin, interest, or convention, has not borne the true yoke of 
laws; one with neither deep-rooted customs nor deep-rooted superstitions; one which is not 
in fear of being overrun by a sudden invasion; which without taking part in its neighbors’ 
quarrels can resist each one of them by itself, or enlist the help of one to repulse the other; 
one whose every member can be known to all, and where one is not forced to charge a man 
with a greater burden than a man can bear; one which can do without all other peoples and 
without which every other people can do; One which is neither rich nor poor, and can be 
self-sufficient; finally, one which combines the stability of an ancient people with the docility 
of a new people.64 
Two years after this was published Rousseau received a letter from Mattéo Buttafoco, a 
Corsican patriot and military officer. He wrote:  
Our island, as you write so well, monsieur, is capable of receiving good legislation; but it 
requires a legislator: he must be a man of your principles, a man whose happiness is 
independent from ours; a man, who thoroughly knows human nature, and who through 
progression of time arranges for a future glory, willing to work in one era, and enjoy it in 
another. Will you deign in tracing a plan for a political system cooperating in the felicity of a 
nation?65 
Buttafoco had clearly read Rousseau – his description echoed Rousseau’s writings on the 
legislator so clearly that, had it not been written to him, one could accuse the Corsican of 
plagiarism. He continued: 
The Corsicans are near the situation that you set for establishing legislation. It has not yet 
felt the true yoke of laws; it is not in fear of being suddenly invaded, as can happen to other 
people; it is neither rich, nor poor, and can be self-sufficient; their prejudices will not be 
difficult to destroy, and I dare say one could link their natural needs with those of Society... 
You will find, I dare say, some virtues, and some morals with the Corsicans. They are 
humane, religious, hospitable, beneficent; they take pride in what they say; they have 
honour, and good faith; and if one ignores the particular case of vendettas, which at present 
are very rare, the examples of assassinations are less frequent than in other peoples… 
Among the Corsicans there are currently no arts, no science, no manufactures, no riches, no 
luxuries: but this is not important, since none of this is necessary for happiness.66 
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Buttafoco did all he could to both flatter and pique Rousseau’s interest and, although 
initially hesitant, Rousseau began working on what would become the Constitutional Project 
for Corsica.67  
While it is clear that this letter was the source of Rousseau’s working relationship with the 
island, it is important that it came after Rousseau’s reference to Corsica was published. That 
is, Buttafoco’s description does not tell us what made the Corsicans unique, only that they 
met the criteria set out in the Social Contract. What is important for us, however, is that 
these criteria, as laid out in the Social Contract, are in many ways insufficient. 
The section dedicated to describing the people capable of receiving laws in the Social 
Contract is found in Book II, chapters eight through ten. Chapter eight sets the problem of 
the ideal people for the book’s audience. It is made clear that his advice is generally not 
applicable to the established peoples of Europe; that not all peoples are the same; that 
finding a correct people is rare; and that knowing when a people can be given laws is 
problematic (not least of all because the correct moment to do so only comes about once).68 
Chapter nine offers general advice on the ideal geographical qualities of the potential state. 
He notes that it must be neither too large for a people to united, or for a government to 
efficiently rule, nor too small to be self-sufficient. Chapter ten turns to population, stating 
that the ratio between land and people must be ‘an appropriate ratio,’ such that it is able to 
produce what is necessary to feed to the population, but also be easily defended. He 
explains that it is ‘impossible to calculate a fixed ratio between the amount of land and the 
number of men each requires’ due to uncertainties such as: the quality of soil, its fertility, 
local produce, climate, the temperament of the people themselves, fertility of women (and 
thus expectations of future population growth), and, finally, he notes that there are ‘a 
thousand occasions when particular accidental features of a given place require or permit 
taking up more land than appears needed.’69 Thus, what Rousseau offers are ambiguous 
guidelines – Goldilocks principles. Perhaps aware of this, he offers two further notes: first, 
that the people must be living in a state of peace; second, he once again offers a set of 
general conditions which a people need to fulfil. These are the qualities parroted above by 
Buttafoco. The problem is that these too are less than explicit – how does one know a 
people is ‘already bound together by some union of origin, interest, or convention, [but] has 
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not borne the true yoke of laws’ or is ‘one which combines the stability of an ancient people 
with the docility of a new people?’ What makes a people ‘neither rich nor poor’ or its 
customs and superstitions ‘deep-rooted?’70 Again, perhaps aware of his own ambiguity, 
Rousseau ends the section on the ideal people capable of receiving the laws outlined in the 
Social Contract by offering one further, and concrete, example: Corsica. 
This suggestion, for this paper’s purpose, however, is not entirely helpful. To explain why 
Rousseau felt the Corsican’s were uniquely suited to the Social Contract, one cannot simply 
point to Rousseau stating that they were. Therefore, because the descriptions offered in the 
Social Contract are not, on their own, enough to make the relationship clear, one must turn 
to Rousseau’s other theoretical reflections on the relationship between primitive peoples 
and the emergence of political order. That is, to further develop our understanding of 
Rousseau’s thoughts on peoples, the following pages bring in Rousseau’s descriptions in the 
Second Discourse – his most complete engagement with the history of peoples as they 
emerge from the state of nature – to compliment his ideas in the Social Contract and 
Corsica.71  
In the Second Discourse Rousseau describes an era which he claims was the happiest and 
most durable epoch of human history. This era, which existed prior to political laws and 
formal institutions, owed its happiness to a number of features, but key amongst them was 
self-sufficiency. Although a key feature in Rousseau’s other political works, the treatment 
the topic – and era – receives in the Second Discourse is of particular interest for this study 
and our understanding as to why Corsica was unique. 
In the Second Discourse Rousseau hypothesizes that with the emergence of social 
sentiments naturally solitary humans are transformed. People came to live together in small 
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communities and language emerged. During this era people had only two interests: ‘the 
comforts of life for oneself, and consideration from others.’72 The first was easily achieved 
before interdependence and superfluous need: ‘Man’s first sentiment was that of his 
existence, his first care that for his preservation. The Earth’s products provided him with all 
necessary support, instinct moved him to use them.’73 While Rousseau accepts that with 
invention new tools and conveniences emerged which brought with them new needs – 
needs which he writes ‘had degenerated into true needs, it became much more cruel to be 
deprived of them than to possess them was sweet, and men were unhappy to lose them 
without being happy to possess them’74 – nonetheless, so long as any individual was capable 
of fulfilling their own needs, true evil did not emerge. Importantly, a similar situation is 
reported amongst the Corsicans: Bellin noted that they met all their needs through farming 
and did not need to turn to ‘the sciences, the liberal arts, engineering, nor trade.’75 In fact, 
Rousseau in the Preface to ‘Narcissus’ noted that Genoa had purposefully attempted to 
destroy this form of freedom by instituting an Academy on the island.76 By introducing 
science and art it was hoped, he argued, that superfluous and unnatural needs would 
follow, and that the freedom maintained through an austere self-sufficiency would be lost 
and the Corsicans more easily subjugated. The second interest of primitive humans – 
‘consideration from others’ – was more problematically satisfied, however.  
Following the emergence of sentiments amongst people – in particular love – jealousy took 
hold and discord followed: ‘As soon as men had begun to appreciate one another and the 
idea of consideration had taken shape in their mind, everyone claimed a right to it, and one 
could no longer deprive anyone of it with impunity.’ He continues: 
[A]ny intentional wrong became an affront because, together with the harm resulting from 
the injury, the offended party saw in it contempt for his person, often more unbearable than 
the harm itself. Thus everyone punishing the contempt shown him in a manner 
proportionate to the stock he set by himself, vengeances became terrible, and men 
bloodthirsty and cruel.77 
Without recourse to laws, everyone had equal right to be judge and executioner in all things 
which they had an interest, and with natural needs being easily fulfilled the most important 
need was satisfying one’s own self-worth. Importantly, however: ‘From here arose the first 
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duties of civility even among Savages.’78 Without laws ‘the terror of vengeance had to take 
the place of the Laws’ restraint.’79  
Again, one finds this description of discord reminiscent the Corsican vendetta – even the 
socializing aspect of the act was noted.80 Frederic Neuhoff wrote: ‘they inculcate revenge as 
one of their first principles of education, and teach it their children from the cradle as the 
chief of moral duties.’ He continues by writing that they ‘are extremely susceptible of the 
slightest touches of ridicule or insult, and carry their vindictive spirit to such excess.’81 
Rousseau offers a similar description of the Corsicans and their ‘indomitable and ferocious 
mood.’ However, he notes that while this temper may be problematic, it was indicative of 
something more important: first, that it was natural for a people who had never been 
governed justly, and second, that it would vanish with good legislation. Rousseau writes: 
‘The Corsican people preserve a large number of its primitive virtues which will facilitate our 
constitution a great deal. In its servitude it has also contracted many vices which it ought to 
cure; of these vices some will disappear by themselves along with the cause that gave birth 
to them, others need a cause to uproot the passion that produced them.’82 Their temper, he 
argues, was an example of the former, and thus, these vices were examples of the natural 
condition of a youthful people. Thus, these were not characteristics which showed the 
Corsicans to be ungovernable, but instead, the opposite was true: their ferociousness was 
both a sign of youthfulness, as well as a result of having not yet been governed justly.  
Rousseau often reflected on the ‘correct age’ of a people.83 In the Social Contract he wrote: 
‘For Nations as for men there is a time of maturity for which one has to wait before 
subjecting them to laws; but the maturity of a people is not always easy to recognize, and if 
one acts too soon the work is ruined.’84 This metaphor is carried over to Corsica: 
There is in all states (peoples) a progression, a natural and necessary development from 
their birth until their destruction… One must not wish that Corsica be right away what it can 
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be (for it would not maintain itself at all in such a condition); it is better that it arrive there 
and that it ascend rather than to be there right away and do nothing but decline.85 
Again, in the Second Discourse, Rousseau wrote that: 
[A]lthough men [at this stage] had less endurance, and natural pity had already undergone 
some attenuation, this period in the development of human faculties, occupying a just mean 
between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour propre, 
must have been the happiest and most lasting epoch… The example of the Savages, almost 
all of whom have been found at this point, seems to confirm that Mankind was made always 
to remain in it, that this state is the genuine youth of the World...86 
There is an important note to be made here: the Second Discourse is not simply a discussion 
about the ideal condition of natural man. Instead it is a narrative outlining their decline. 
Thus, there is a risk that the Corsicans may, like the rest of Europe, stumble as they find 
their feet as a free people. It is necessary, then, to recall what initiated the end for this this 
happy historical state: agriculture and metallurgy.87 
Metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts the invention of which brought about this 
great revolution... [I]t is iron and wheat that civilized men, and ruined Mankind. Indeed, both 
were unknown to the Savages of America who have therefore always remained such; even 
other Peoples seem to have remained Barbarians as long as they engaged in one of these 
Arts without the other.88 
It was the combination of these arts that Genoa had prevented from taking hold in Corsica. 
Rousseau notes that the ‘Genoese boasted about having favored agriculture on the Island 
[and] the Corsicans appear to agree with them,’ yet in doing this the goal was ‘abasement 
by attaching them so to speak to their soil, by turning them away from commerce, the arts, 
from all lucrative professions, by keeping them from rising up, from being educated, from 
becoming rich.’ While he attacks their intentions, he nonetheless notes that they succeeded 
in stunting progress: ‘The discouraged Corsicans abandoned a labor that was not animated 
by any hope. They preferred to do nothing rather than to fatigue themselves at a pure 
loss.’89 Thus, there was little actual agricultural progress, let alone metallurgical science and 
industry.  
When addressing improvements necessary for the island, finding a domestic source of iron 
was noted as being important (and Rousseau argued that there would surely to be deposits 
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somewhere given the island’s geographical make-up). Forges, too, would need to be 
established, and the skills necessary for metal-working would need to be learned, as these 
were amongst those things which ‘the Island does not furnish now, but which it can furnish 
when better cultivated and enlivened by industry.’ He warns, however, that ‘one ought to 
set aside the idle arts, the arts of comfort and softness, the more one ought to favour those 
that are useful for agriculture and advantageous to human life.’90 
The importance here is not simply that there are similarities in structure or narrative 
between the Second Discourse’s position on agriculture and metallurgy and Corsica’s own 
history. The point is that without a system of internal interdependency emerging from 
specialization – without people having moved away from agrarian lifestyles – a natural 
individual freedom had been maintained amongst the people of Corsica. As Istvan Hont 
argued, the crucial point is that: 
[Metallurgy] led to an escalation in the spiralling growth of artificial needs that characterized 
the history of civilization under the influence of amour-propre… Metallurgy gave rise to 
industry, a species of economic endeavor divorced from the land. A metallurgist did not 
produce food but exchanged his products for it. That was a huge step forward in the division 
of labor.91  
These two classes would not remain in equilibrium as the industrialists could always 
produce new items and thus create new desires and needs. The outcome, as people turned 
their backs to agrarian life, would only be ‘social collapse and depopulation.’92 This is the 
end from which Rousseau aimed to protect Corsica. 
Again, the necessities of life for the Corsican were easily achieved. Domenico Caminer made 
this clear in 1768: ‘There are agrarian territorial divisions, not established by law but existing 
in fact. They live communally but there is hardly anyone who does not have some small plot 
that he can call his own.’93 Carrington similarly noted: ‘[T]he Corsicans see no reason to 
work any harder, to grow more food, when they already have enough to eat, and that if 
they did they would have great difficulty in selling their surpluses… [T]here is no one to 
make them work all day: their land belongs to them, as does their time.’94 By having 
dedicated their lives to agriculture and self-sufficiency – albeit by force – the Corsicans had 
avoided the next step in Rousseau’s Second Discourse: the duplicitous rich imposing laws 
aimed at protecting their own privileges and wealth.95 Again, this is a point on which 
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Rousseau is explicit in his writings for Corsica – albeit in the guise of a history of 
Switzerland.96 
The island of Corsica, says Diodorus, is mountainous, full of woods, and watered by large 
rivers. Its inhabitants feed themselves upon milk and honey, and meat with which the 
country generously furnishes them. They observe among themselves the rules of justice and 
humanity more precisely than the other barbarians... Mountains, woods, rivers, pastures. 
Would one not believe that one was reading the description of Switzerland? Also was the 
same character that Diodorus attributes to the Corsicans not found in the Swiss: equity, 
humanity, good faith?97 
While the Diodorus Siculus text referred to – The Library of History98 – is ancient, if the 
people of Corsica were historically stunted by the Genoese, the people described by 
Diodorus would continue to share characteristics with their eighteenth century descendants 
– and examples of exactly this are available. Boswell offers this report of his time amongst 
the Corsicans:  
When we grew hungry, we threw stones among the thick branches of chestnut trees which 
overshadowed us, and in that manner we brought down a shower of chestnuts with which 
we filled our pockets, and went on eating them with great relish; and when this made us 
thirsty, we lay down by the side of the first brook, put our mouths to the stream, and drank 
sufficiently. It was just being for a little while, one of the ‘prisca gens mortalium, the 
primitive race of men,’ who ran about in the woods eating acorns and drinking water.99 
These reports (and those examined earlier in this paper) are what allowed Rousseau to 
claim that, helpfully, the Corsicans had preserved many of their primitive virtues. The point 
of this being, the Social Contract was written with a historic Swiss people and character in 
mind, and this fortunate character was also applicable to the ancient and contemporary 
Corsican. However, Rousseau also uses this comparison as a warning.  
Rousseau notes that: ‘In general Switzerland is a poor and sterile country. Their government 
is Republican everywhere. But in cantons that are more fertile than the others such as those 
of Berne, of Soleure, and of Freiburg, the Government is Aristocratic.’100 With wealth comes 
a loss of freedom and those Swiss regions which were unlucky enough to be blessed with 
fertile land were quickly corrupted by luxury. Even those attached to sterile land ultimately 
became corrupted, however. The Swiss had a natural character, one much like the 
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Corsicans, which made them ideal mercenaries.101 The profit which followed this work gave 
them ‘a taste for money [which] made them feel that they were poor; disdain for their 
station insensibly destroyed the virtues that were its work and the Swiss became five-penny 
men.’102 Again, Rousseau notes that ‘Poverty did not make itself felt in Switzerland until 
money began to circulate there.’ He continues: 
Establishments of commerce and manufacturing multiplied. The arts took multitudes of 
hands away from agriculture. While distributing themselves unevenly, men multiplied, they 
spread out into countries more favourably situated and where resources were even easier to 
come by. Some deserted their fatherland, others became useless to it by consuming while 
not producing anything. The multitude of children became burdensome. Population growth 
sensibly diminished, and while they multiplied in the cities, since the cultivation of the lands 
was more neglected and the necessities of life more costly, which made foreign 
commodities more necessary, they made the country more dependent on its neighbors. The 
idle life introduced corruption and multiplied pensioners of the powers; love of the 
fatherland, extinguished in all hearts, gave way there to love of money alone; all the feelings 
that give resiliency to the soul being stifled, one no longer saw either firmness in conduct or 
vigor in resolutions. Previously poor Switzerland gave the law to France, now rich 
Switzerland trembles at the knit brow of a French minister.103 
Thus, although the Swiss’ mountainous isolation resulted in an independent and robust 
character, the emergence of commerce ended their simple and uniform tastes, and a love of 
luxury led to the corruption of their people and politics. 
The Corsicans, sharing much with Switzerland, are thus also vulnerable to these potential 
sources of corruption, warns Rousseau. He concludes his historical lessons by noting that: 
‘These are great lessons for the Corsican people; let us see how it ought to apply them.’104 
Before seeing how Rousseau does this – and how these reflections may or may not differ 
from those found in the Social Contract – it is possible now to answer the prime question 
this paper set out to answer: what made the Corsicans unique enough to be explicitly 
highlighted as ideal candidates for the Social Contract.  
It is clear that reports of the island allowed for Rousseau to imagine a pre-political people 
akin to those described in the Second Discourse, a people who combined ‘the stability of an 
ancient people with the docility of a new people.’ What is more, having lived under the 
tyranny of Genoa, yet being divorced from any normalized legal system, they were ‘bound 
together by some union of origin, interest, or convention’ but had yet to come to know ‘the 
true yoke of laws.’105 Instead they relied on violence and vengeance to maintain social 
                                                          
101
 Venturi, like Rousseau, notes this similarity. The Corsicans, he argues, had a ‘fate which compelled them to 
serve in foreign armies as if they too were poor mountain folk like the Swiss’ (Venturi, Italy and the 
Enlightenment, p. 136). 
102
 Rousseau, Corsica, iii.OC, pp. 915-916 (Kelly, vol. 11, p. 135). 
103
 Ibid., pp. 916-917 (Kelly, vol. 11, p. 136). 
104
 Ibid., p. 917 (Kelly, vol. 11, p. 136). 
105
 Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.OC, p. 390 (Gourevitch, p. 77). 
cohesion. However, while being united as a people, they were not interdependent. Freedom 
and equality remained, thanks to Genoa having prevented the emergence of industry and 
commerce. Finally, they also shared qualities with that historical people who had initially 
been given the laws contained in the Social Contract: the Genevans. Thus, unlike the case 
with the philosophes, it was not enlightened Pasquale Paoli who drew the Corsicans to 
Rousseau’s attention. Rousseau was reflecting on the plight of the island by at least 1753, in 
the Preface to ‘Narcissus’ – at least a year before Paoli’s return to the island, and two before 
the new regime declared independence and established their enlightened constitution. 
What is more, there is no mention of Paoli in Rousseau's famous footnote. In 1762 Rousseau 
was still writing about – and ultimately for – the ‘brave people’ of Corsica in the Social 
Contract. Thus, as Rousseau wrote on lessons for Corsica, ‘let us see how it ought to apply 
them.’ 
Corsica and the Social Contract 
At the beginning of Corsica, Rousseau notes that the islanders ‘have gained much since they 
have been free, they have joined prudence to courage, they have learned to obey their 
equals, they have acquired virtues and morals, and they do not have any laws at all. If they 
could stay that way by themselves, I would see almost nothing to do.’106 However, he also 
states that they ‘have not yet taken on the vices of other nations, but they have already 
taken on their prejudices; it is these prejudices that must be combatted and destroyed in 
order to form a good establishment.’107 Thus, Rousseau’s goal – in addition to giving good 
laws – was the destruction of the prejudices of other nations. To do so required one to 
address the particularities of the island and its people – to come to know Corsica like an 
architect – and modify the principles found in the Social Contract to fit. That is to say, while 
there may initially appear to be areas of incongruence between the two texts, by 
foregrounding Rousseau’s understanding of the island it becomes possible to recognize the 
relationship between Corsica and the Social Contract is one of specific application and, 
perhaps, moderation. Just as the imagined nature of the people of Corsica encouraged 
Rousseau to engage with them, this imagined nature also dictated how they would be 
engaged with. Therefore, the final pages of this paper will examine how Rousseau’s own 
understanding of Corsica resulted in, and mitigated, his particular proposals for the 
island.108 
Commerce 
Although Rousseau recognized the Corsicans as being unique, they were not perfect. As 
noted, they had begun to pick up the prejudices of other nations. Perhaps the most 
troubling of these was a desire to engage in commerce. As Schaeffer noted, the ‘Corsicans 
had begun to lose their taste for the simple agricultural life and to develop an interest in 
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commerce as a way of overcoming their poverty. This inclination had not yet borne fruit 
only because Genoese policies hindered commerce in an effort to keep the people poor and 
dependent.’109 However, Rousseau was explicit that Corsica should dissuade itself from such 
aims, lest they also embrace the domestic cost of commercial society: inequality, division, 
taxation, crime, depopulation, and the ruin of the nation. Instead, he told them to focus on 
agricultural self-sufficiency and reap the benefits outlined in the Social Contract.110  
On the face of it, this is not a particularly surprising position for Rousseau to take. However, 
the careful reader of the Social Contract will note that Rousseau earlier argued that peoples 
who ‘occupy extensive and convenient shores’ should ‘[c]over the sea with ships, cultivate 
commerce and navigation; [they] will have a brilliant and a brief existence.’111 That it so say, 
there is something about Corsica which would seem to almost immediately exclude it from 
the lessons found in the Social Contract. What is more, in Corsica he noted that Genoa had 
provided the island with a system which produced excess goods – ideal for a budding 
commercial society. However, he warned: ‘It is not at all to your advantage to export them, 
but rather that enough men be born on the Island to consume them.’112 Commerce would 
be necessary if the island were lacking in necessities, but when a state is capable of being 
self-sufficient international trade can only result in the import of superfluities – and with 
them, new desires, needs, and ultimately, forms of subjugation.113  
Trade was not to be entirely abandoned, however. Owing to its primitive economy and 
natural conditions, some parts of the island produced goods in abundance while others 
struggled. Thus, while the island as a whole did not lack the necessities required for self-
sufficiency, particular regions were less fertile than others.114 To solve the problem of 
regional inequality, and in order to most efficiently and successfully make use of what the 
island did have, some form of internal trade was necessary: ‘The project of an evenly 
distributed population thus requires a circulation of commodities, an easy flowing from one 
jurisdiction into another and consequently an interior commerce.’115 To achieve this 
Rousseau proposed the state act as a central planner, organizing trade amongst the regions 
without the use of currency. A couple of important positive externalities would follow from 
this. First, by conducting transactions under a barter system, accumulation of wealth (as 
measured in currency) would be avoided and equality maintained. In fact, even were it 
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possible to become rich, there would be little benefit to those living in Corsica where money 
would have little actual value.116 Second, these internal relationships would result in closer 
integration through mutual dependence. Rousseau concludes: ‘Everyone must live and no 
one get rich. This is the fundamental principle of the nation’s prosperity, and for its part the 
public order that I am proposing moves towards this as directly as possible.’117  
The Church 
Commerce was not the only vice which Corsica had picked up from other nations – one of 
the recurring themes in the reports examined earlier in this paper was the Corsicans 
devotion to the Catholic Church. This was not simply a spiritual relationship, however. While 
the Church was a theological guide, it also provided temporal support in the guise of 
political and monetary aid. As early as 1731 it took the side of the rebels by declaring the 
initial revolt just.118 Carrington noted that ‘during the national rebellion the Corsican clergy, 
having repudiated the Genoese bishops, became less a religious institution than an 
association of militant patriots.’119 Elsewhere she wrote how the relative wealth of the 
clergy was invaluable to the rebel state. The Church was persuaded to melt down 
ecclesiastical ornaments to provide metals for the mint, to finance the university by a 
voluntary gift, and supply money to the treasury in moments of crisis.120 This support did 
not go unnoticed – under Paoli’s rule the Church gained representation in the general diet 
making the relationship with the revolutionary state structural. Thus, Thrasher has argued 
that ‘the Corsican clergy formed, to a very large degree, a national Church. The priests were 
more concerned with their own villages than with any idea of a great and universal order. 
Their greater unit was Corsica, not Rome. Indeed, many of them closely approximated to 
that Savoyard Vicar of Rousseau.’121  
What Rousseau knew or thought about this quasi-‘national Church’ is impossible to say. 
What is certain is that even if the influence of Rome had declined during the eighteenth-
century the Church was nonetheless an important part of Corsican life, and, as seen above, 
the religiosity of the people was well documented. However, while this would clearly have 
been problematic for the Rousseau of the Social Contract (where he writes that Catholicism 
is ‘so manifestly bad that it is a waste of time to amuse oneself demonstrating that it is’)122 
he is much less polemical in Corsica. In fact, the church is only mentioned once in his 
proposals for the island, and this is not particularly critical. However, he does not leave its 
power unchecked. Returning to the example of Switzerland, he notes that during the 
Reformation Protestant cantons found financial aid in taking Catholic possessions. He then 
writes: 
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I do not say that the Corsicans ought to touch the revenues of the Church, God forbid! but I 
believe that the people will not be extremely vexed if the State asks them for as much as the 
clergy – already sufficiently endowed with estates of land – ask them. The basis of this tax 
will be [established] without difficulty, without trouble and almost without expense because 
it will only be necessary to double the ecclesiastical tithe and take half of it.123 
His position, once again, is pragmatic and keenly aware of its audience. The relationship 
between the Corsicans and their religious leaders was not one that would be easily 
corrected. However, in demanding financial support from the Church through taxation, 
Rousseau makes it clear that the relationship must benefit the state, and more importantly, 
that the state is supreme – there would be only one source of legitimate authority in 
Corsica: the people.  
Democracy and Class 
Rousseau’s understanding of a legitimate political system was one in which the people 
would express the sovereign will directly. This would be accomplished by the people coming 
together on fixed and recurring dates to make this will clearly known.124 Once the general 
will was expressed, the government would then act as the administrator of this will. 
Unsurprisingly, this was something which was best suited to small states where ‘the people 
is easily assembled, and where every citizen can easily know all the rest.’125 Rousseau 
explicitly states that size is a limit:  
I shall be told that this may be good for a single city; but what is to be done when the State 
includes several cities? […] I answer […] that it is always an evil to unite several cities into a 
single City, and anyone who wants to bring about such a union should not flatter himself 
that he can avoid its natural inconveniences. The abuse of large States should not be used as 
an objection to someone who wants only small ones.126 
Thus, Rousseau’s proposals were a problem for a large island with a dispersed population. 
What is more, his position on representative democracy – the simplest solution to the 
problem – was also excluded in the Social Contract:  
Sovereignty cannot be represented… [I]t consists essentially in the general will, and the will 
does not admit of being represented: either it is the same or it is different; there is no 
middle ground. The deputies of the people therefore are not and cannot be its 
representatives, they are merely its agents; they cannot conclude anything definitively. Any 
law which the People has not ratified in person is null; it is not a law.127  
Thus, representation is not legitimate, and some form of direct democracy remains 
necessary.  
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Rousseau notes that this is a problem in Corsica, and he must manipulate his principles to 
overcome it: 
As I have said the rustic system entails the Democratic state. Thus the form that we have to 
choose is given. It is true that there are some modifications to make in its application 
because of the size of the Island; for a purely democratic government suits a small town 
rather than a nation. One could not assemble the whole people of a country like that of a 
city and when the supreme authority is conferred upon deputies, the government changes 
and becomes Aristocratic. The one that suits Corsica is a mixed Government in which the 
people is assembled only in parts and in which the depositaries of its power are often 
changed.128 
This mixed government, he seemed to hope, would still allow for the emergence of the 
general will – albeit expressed less frequently and never at once.  
This problematic relationship between the people and the expression of the general will, 
however, likely worried Rousseau. In Political Economy he wrote that if you want ‘the 
general will carried out [you must see] to it that all particular wills take their bearings by 
it.’129 Although it is unclear whether expressing the general will more frequently and 
completely – that is, whether participatory democracy itself – resulted in a more virtuous 
populace in Rousseau’s thought, without the people ever having the opportunity to witness 
the general will fully expressed, and living particular lives outside of the tight communities 
imagined in the Social Contract, it is likely that it would have less of a clear impact on the 
population. Thus, Rousseau moved to unite the general and particular in Corsica.  
To accomplish this end Rousseau offers another, initially, alarming proposal: while in the 
Social Contract he writes that ‘the social pact establishes among the Citizens an equality 
such that all commit themselves under the same conditions and must all enjoy the same 
rights,’130 in Corsica he argues for the institution of a class system.131 This is only initially 
alarming because it should be noted that Rousseau does not dismiss the utility of classes in 
the Social Contract. The problem was when such systems worked to counter equality and 
equal rights by linking privileges to particular families or groups: 
When I say that the object of the laws is always general, I mean that the law considers the 
subjects in a body and their actions in the abstract, never any man as an individual or a 
particular action. Thus the law can very well state that there will be privileges, but it cannot 
confer them to any one by name; the law can create several Classes of Citizens, it can even 
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specify the qualifications that entitle to membership in these classes, but it cannot nominate 
this person or that for admission to them.132 
Thus, in Corsica he argues for states to grant class distinctions based on merit, virtue, and 
other ‘services rendered to the fatherland.’133  
Specifically, Rousseau’s Corsican class system aimed to divide all male residents into three 
classes: citizens, patriots, and aspirants. One would be able to graduate through these 
classes on merit: all those born on the island and below the age of twenty would be 
aspirants;134 those aspirants who married and had property could become patriots; patriots 
who had two or more children, in addition to owning enough property to live off, could 
become citizens.135 Importantly, all those who had fought for Corsica’s independence would 
have automatically been granted the rights of citizen – as Rousseau wrote: ‘It is very just 
that all these valiant men who have freed their nation at the price of their blood enter into 
possession of all these advantages and enjoy in the first rank the freedom they acquired for 
it.’136 Of course, by awarding the nation’s heroes the rank of citizenship immediately would 
have gone some way towards instilling the class system with legitimacy from its beginnings 
– a legitimacy which, ideally, would have encouraged others to strive to achieve similar 
accolades. 
The aim of this system was to ensure that particular wills provided a positive externality for 
society as a whole. As noted, farming and population growth were Corsica’s first two needs. 
However, without financial incentives to encourage excess production, and a mixed-
democracy which meant the good of the nation – the general will – would be less regularly 
engaged with by the people of Corsica, Rousseau had to turn to self-interest as a method of 
uniting the particular and general will: 
[A]ll the intentions of the foundation here tend to make this station happy in its mediocrity, 
respectable in its simplicity. Furnishing all the needs of life, all the public tributes without 
sales and without trafficking, all the means for consideration, it will not even allow a better 
or nobler one to be imagined. Not seeing anything above them, those who carry it on will 
make it their glory, and opening up for themselves a path to greater employments they will 
fill it like the first Romans. Not being able to leave this station, one will want to distinguish 
oneself in it, one will want to fill it better than others do, to make larger harvests, to furnish 
a stronger contingent to the state, to deserve the people’s votes in elections. Large families 
well nourished and well clothed will bring honor to leaders; and, since real abundance will 
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be the sole object of luxury, each will want to distinguish himself by that sort of luxury. As 
long as the human heart remains what it is such establishments will not produce laziness.137 
Conclusion 
One can see that tensions appear to exist between Corsica and the Social Contract. Rather 
than break with his initial principles, however, Rousseau shows himself to be much more 
pragmatic in the manipulation of his ideas. In proposing institutions which avoid commerce 
at all costs, by limiting the role of the Church, manipulating his democratic system, and 
introducing classes, the ends of Corsica remain in line with the Social Contract – even if the 
means appear to occasionally stray. Importantly, what one finds in Corsica is not simply a 
restatement of his principles, but instead one witnesses them fleshed out in more, albeit 
particular, detail. That is, Rousseau’s proposals in Corsica allow one to witness the workings 
of the legislator and the ideas of the Social Contract in action.  
It is important to remember that anything one may learn about Corsica from Rousseau is 
accidental, if not incidental.138 Instead, what is important to take from Rousseau’s 
understanding of Corsica is that it was unique and ‘in the fortunate condition that makes a 
good constitution possible… Full of vigor and health it can devote itself to the government 
that keeps it vigorous and healthy.’139 By recognizing this, this paper has, through historical 
study, attempted to recreate the details of Corsica which allowed Rousseau to make this 
claim, and by doing this, come to learn more about his own conceptions of peoples capable 
of receiving laws – both in the Corsican context and more generally. That is, when examined 
through the lens of Corsica, this process allows one to see the arguments contained in the 
Social Contract in practice. While the proposals may differ, this is indicative of his ideas – as 
he always claimed – requiring manipulation when applied to a particular time, place, and 
people. Finally, what Rousseau did with Corsica may allow us to temper interpretations of 
idealism which have always dogged Rousseau.140  
Upon hearing of Butaffoco’s Corsican request, Alexander Deleyre wrote to Rousseau; he 
asked whether the philosopher could in fact act as a Lycurgus or Solon, to embrace their 
deception and cruelty, and to move from general to particular.141 Rousseau was the last 
person who needed to be reminded of this – he was explicit in the Social Contract that the 
legislator’s task was one which required persuasion rather than convincing.142 In fact, 
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Rousseau did seem reluctant when it came to taking the steps he had imagined necessary in 
his earlier work – and this may be where Corsica breaks away from the Social Contract most 
clearly: 
Although I know that the Corsican nation has prejudices very contrary to my principles, my 
intention is not at all to employ the art of persuading in order to make them adopt them. On 
the contrary I want to tell them my opinion and my reasons with such simplicity that there is 
nothing in it that can seduce them, because it is very possible that I am mistaken and I would 
be very sorry for them to adopt my sentiment to their harm.143 
It is perhaps for this reason – Rousseau’s fear to embrace his own legislative techniques and 
fear that his proposals may be mistaken – that Corsica, which was completed in 1765, four 
years before the island fell to France, was never made available. Perhaps it was a task which 
he was not prepared to embrace fully, and in that sense, for all its pragmatism, remained 
strictly theoretical. 
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